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EVALUATING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TRENDS IN
MEGA-PETITIONS, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS REVEAL A COSTLY DILEMMA
FOR SPECIES CONSERVATION
"For more than three decades, the Endangered Species
Act has successfully protected our nation's most
threatened wildlife, and we should be looking for ways to
improve it - not weaken it. Throughout our history,
there's been a tension between those who've sought to
conserve our natural resources for the benefit of future
generations, and those who have sought to profit from
these resources. But I'm here to tell you this is a false
choice. With smart, sustainable policies, we can grow our
economy today and preserve the environment for ourselves, our children, and our grandchildren."
-President Barack Obamal
I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2013 called for a celebration in recognition of the
fortieth anniversary of the Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act).2
In 1973, President Nixon signed the ESA into effect, acknowledging
the growing concern that natural resources in the United States
were deteriorating.3 While signing the Act, President Nixon
stressed:
Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation than the rich array of animal life with which our
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to Commemorate the 160th
Anniversary of the Department of Interior, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:13 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-commemorate160th-anniversary-department-interior (arguing natural resources can serve both
industry and environmentalist interests without conflict); accord Noelle Straub, 'We
Can Grow Our Economy and Preserve the Environment,' Obama Says at Interior, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/-gwire/2009/03/03/03greenwirewe-can-grow-our-economy-and-preserve-the-enviro-9972.html (discussing President
Obama's speech for Department of Interior's 160th anniversary).
2. See Endangered Species Act 40th Anniversary, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,

http://www.fws.gov/endangered/ESA40/index.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2014)
(highlighting fortieth anniversary of ESA).
3. Richard Nixon: Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, AM.
PRESIDENCY

PROJEcr,

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4090

(last visited Jan. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Richard Nixon] (documenting President
Nixon's December 28, 1973 ESA signing statement).

(307)
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country has been blessed. It is a many-faceted treasure, of
value to scholars, scientists, and nature lovers alike, and it
forms a vital part of the heritage we all share as
Americans. 4
Four decades later, however, this aging Act desperately needs repair, as it struggles to protect the species President Nixon and

others so strongly supported.5
Currently, Section Four of the ESA, which outlines the Act's
species listing and critical habitat designation requirements, is
"more dysfunctional than at any other point in the statute's history."6 The species listing and critical habitat designation programs
have created a battleground for competing interest groups that frequently debate the Act's function and litigate under the ESA. 7 ESA
litigation has developed a noticeable pattern: first, environmental
groups petition the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS or
Agency) to list a certain species or designate particular habitats as
critical in order to prevent threatened or endangered species from
becoming extinct.8 If the FWS ignores these petitions, environmentalists often initiate lawsuits against the Agency to force action
under the ESA. 9 Alternatively, if the FWS lists a species, industry or
landowner groups opposed to federal regulation imposed by the
ESA seek judicial review of the FWS's listing or critical habitat designation. 10 By challenging the FWS's determination, opponents seek
to demonstrate the action fails the judicial review standards set by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) so that the reviewing court
will set aside the Agency's action." This litigation pattern, accompanied by the heated debate surrounding species protection and
looming budget cuts, makes the FWS's compliance with the ESA

4. Id. (quoting President Nixon).
5. For a detailed discussion of how the ESA currently functions, see infra
notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
6. Daniel J. Rohlf, Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act: Top Ten Issues for the
Next Thirty Years, 34 ENVrL. L. 483, 496 (2004) (detailing issues arising from ESA's
species listing and critical habitat designation requirements).
7. Id. (describing contentious issues surrounding ESA Section Four).
8. For a further examination of how citizen groups petition for species listing,
see infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of citizens bringing suits against the ESA, see infra notes
79-113 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of industry and landowner's judicial review suits,
see infra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of judicial review standards for FWS action, see
infra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
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increasingly difficult. 12 Change in the status quo is uncertain, however, because "[b] ringing some semblance of order to this area continues to present one of the foremost administrative challenges in
implementing the entire endangered species program."1 3
This Comment highlights the current controversy over ESA citizen petitions to the FWS, the contentious litigation that often results from these petitions, and the ongoing debate surrounding
such litigation.14 Though petitioners' actions may be well-intentioned, the FWS ultimately will have fewer resources to protect
plants and animals from extinction if the trend in citizen petitions
continues. 15 Part II describes the ESA's history, discusses the Act's
relevant sections, including the citizen petition clause, and briefly
explains judicial review for FWS action.16 Part III of this Comment
begins by explaining the problems stemming from the influx of citizen petitions and environmental group litigation seeking to enforce
deadlines and critical habitat requirements. 17 Next, it describes the
pattern of landowners and industry groups initiating judicial review
of FWS actions.1 8 Part III concludes by describing the controversy
surrounding the FWS's request for funding caps and summarizing
the impact on the ESA. 19 Part IV explores the possible environmental benefits of maintaining the status quo in regard to citizen
petitions. 20 The section further investigates suggested alternatives
in favor of reforming the ESA and its bureaucratic deficiencies. 2 1
Part V concludes with what the United States can expect future ESA
protections to resemble, including litigation trends, agency behav-

12. For a brief discussion of how conservation groups and industry groups put
the FWS in a bind, see infra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
13. Rohlf, supra note 6, at 496 (describing FWS's predicament).
14. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding citizen petitions, see infra
notes 79-113 and 184-232 and accompanying text.
15. For further analysis of the negative impacts of citizen petitions, see infra
notes 217-232 and accompanying text.
16. For detailed background information of the ESA, see infra notes 23-73
and accompanying text.
17. For an examination of the current controversy surrounding increased litigation against the FWS, see infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of judicial review challenges raised by landowners and
industry groups, see infra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the FWS's budget caps requests, see infra notes 147-171
and accompanying text. For a discussion on the overall impact on ESA programs,
see infra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the pros and cons of the status quo, see infra notes 184232 and accompanying text.
21. For an exploration of the possible alternatives to the problem instigated
by citizen petitions, see infra notes 233-292 and accompanying text.
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ior, and the ultimate outcome for plant, animal, and human
22
protection.

II.

BACKGROUND

In the early 1970s, an environmental revolution was born: environmentalists and politicians alike grew concerned with the nation's dwindling natural resources and the impending extinction of
plants and animals. 2 3 In response to this new wave of environmental consciousness, Congress passed major environmental regulations, including the ESA. 2 4 Congress itself noted "that our rich
natural heritage is of 'esthetic, ecological, educational, recreational,
and scientific value to our Nation and its people."' 2 5
Congress enacted the ESA, sometimes referred to as the "'pit
bull' of environmental laws," to protect endangered and threatened
species, as well as ecosystems.2 6 Congress designated two agencies
to administer the ESA: the United States Department of the Interior's (DOI) Fish and Wildlife Service and the United States Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 27
Citizens, industrial leaders, politicians, and the judiciary all quickly
recognized the ESA for its aggressive stance on species protection;
22. For a discussion on the future of the ESA, see infra notes 293-323 and
accompanying text.
23. Jerry L. Anderson, The EnvironmentalRevolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS
L.J. 395, 395-96 (1995) (describing environmental revolution during 1970s); ESA
Basics: 40 Years of Conserving Endangered Species, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. Jan.
2013), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/ESA-basics.pdf [hereinafter ESA Basics] (explaining Congress' motivation in passing ESA).
24. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012) (stating goal to
preserve endangered and threatened species); Richard Nixon, supra note 3 (commending 93rd Congress for enacting ESA).
25. ESA Basics, supra note 23 (explaining Congress' recognition that endangered species have value worth protecting).
26. Gregory T. Broderick, Towards Common Sense in ESA Enforcement: Federal
Courts and the Limits on Administrative Authority and Discretion under the Endangered
Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77, 78 (2004) (describing environmental laws
passed in early 1970s); 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (stating purpose of ESA); see also Endangered Species Act: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/index.html (last updated July 15, 2013) (briefly explaining
ESA).
27. ESA Basics, supra note 23 (listing agencies responsible for administering
ESA). The FWS is responsible for a larger portion of ESA listings because it protects terrestrial and freshwater species, while NMFS, a division of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, solely protects marine species. See id.
This Comment is specific to the FWS and does not make assumptions about ESA
litigation dynamics for the NMFS listing decisions. For additional information on
the NMFS and its listing involvement, see generally Endangeredand Threatened Marine
(last upSpecies, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/esa/
dated Dec. 13, 2013).
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shortly after the Act's enactment, the Supreme Court interrupted
the 100 million dollar Tellico Dam project, partly funded by Congress, to protect the snail darter. 28
The ESA outlines a framework for identifying certain species
that need federal protection, assists agencies in creating species recovery plans, and allows the delisting of a species once it recovers.29
Section Four of the ESA sets forth the requirements for these protections.3 0 Section Eleven allows citizens to petition for the FWS to
list species or designate critical habitats under the Act and sue the
Agency to comply with nondiscretionary deadlines and responsibilities.31 Notably, any FWS action or inaction concerning the ESA is
subject to judicial review under the APA, a "second-level constitution" for government agencies.3 2

28. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978) (enjoining completion of 100 million dollar Tellico Dam project because of conflict with ESA's protection of snail darter); Broderick, supra note 26, at 83 (describing ESA as tough).
The Supreme Court appropriately characterized the Tellico Dam controversy,
stating:
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number
of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would
require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which
Congress has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not
minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums
of public money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations
Committees were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the
snail darter. We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the
Endangered Species Act require precisely that result.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 172-73.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)-(f) (providing standards for recovering species).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (establishing framework for listing and delisting
threatened or endangered species). For a discussion of Section Four, see infra
notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (providing for citizen-initiated action). See generally, Susan D. Daggett, NGOs as Lawmakers, Watchdogs, Whistleblowers, and Private
Attorneys General, 13 COLO. J. INT L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 99 (2002) (discussing environmentalists' role in ESA protections). For a discussion of Section Eleven, see
infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (providing scope of review of administrative agency
action). The term "second-level constitution" was coined by administrative law
scholar Joseph Vining. SeeJoseph Vining, Administrative Agencies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERIcAN CONSTITUTION 36, 37 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 2000), available at http://www.gmu.ac.ir/-download/booklibrary/e-library-1/Encyclopedia%20
of%20American%2OConstitution.pdf. The APA functions as a regulatory constitution because it "specif[ies] procedures and structural relations within and among
[the agencies], and between [the agencies] and other entities." Id. For a discussion ofjudicial review of the FWS action under the APA, see infra notes 65-73 and
accompaniymg text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014

5

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 10

312
A.

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXV: p. 307

Listing Decisions and Critical Habitat Designations under the
ESA

Section Four of the Act mandates the FWS to list endangered
and threatened species and to designate a critical habitat for each
species listed.3 3 Section Four also establishes the procedures for
listing and delisting threatened or endangered species.34 Aside
from specifying the listing criteria, this section affords two avenues
for listing a species: the FWS can list a species on its own initiative,
or it may list a species after receiving a citizen petition requesting
the listing of a particular species.3 5
The FWS must consider the following five factors when determining whether to list a species, only one of which must be present
to warrant listing: "(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) over-utilization
for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory
mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its
continued existence."3 6 The Act establishes an overarching criterion requiring the FWS to evaluate these factors in light of the best
available scientific evidence.37 Further, the FWS must reject protec33. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (providing framework for listing and delisting species).
The ESA defines "endangered species" as "any species which is in danger of extinc-

tion throughout all or a significant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). It
defines "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (providing framework for listing and delisting
species).
35. Id. (authorizing Secretary to list species); 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g) (1) (permitting "any person" to bring a civil suit to compel FWS action). For a discussion of
the citizen petition process, see infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (A)-(E) (articulating factors supporting listing
under ESA). For a helpful review of the statutory framework for ESA listing and
delisting procedures, see Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 103-05
(D.D.C. 1995).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (outlining listing factors); 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(b)(1) (requiring best available science). Congress never explained what
meets the best available scientific evidence standard in Section Four. Michael J.
Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the "Best Scientific Data
Available" Standardin the EndangeredSpecies Act, 16 TUL. ENvrL. L.J. 387, 390 (2003).
Environmental law scholar Holly Doremus states, however, "In the ESA listing context, science is synonymous with biology. Congress repeatedly equated the two,
noting that a listing petition need only present 'biological information;' permitting
extension of listing deadlines only for disputes over 'biological information;' and
emphasizing that 'non-biological considerations' have no role in listing decisions."
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029, 1056 (1997) [hereinafter Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy].
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tion cost as a factor for whether to list the species.38 Once a species
is listed, it remains under federal protection until the FWS determines the species has recovered. 39
To further ensure a species' survival, Section Four mandates
the FWS to designate a species' critical habitat at the same time the
Agency lists the species. 40 It is often a costly and time-consuming
process for the FWS to determine what range of land may be included in this habitat. 41 The Agency must consider "the economic
impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant impact" and weigh the designation benefits against the potential risk
of species extinction.4 2
Although Congress established the ESA partially to "provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved," the FWS customarily
forgoes critical habitat designation when it lists a species.4 3 The
FWS justifies its decision not to designate critical habitats according
to the ESA timelines because of the inadequate resources available
to implement the program, the difficulty in gathering information
about a particular species' habitat, and the Agency's doubtfulness
that species gain any benefit from habitat designation not already
afforded in other required ESA protections.4 4 Like listings, critical
38. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (noting Congress'
plain intent to preserve endangered species at any cost).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (requiring DOI Secretary to periodically review
species' status and delist if possible).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (asserting DOI Secretary must designate critical habitat for species concurrently with listing). Critical habitat is defined as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section
1533 of this title, on which are found those physical or biological features
(I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require
special management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species
at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of
this title, upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.

16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (A)(i)-(ii).
41. Broderick, supra note 26, at 99 (explaining cost of critical habitat
designation).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2) (listing standards for determining critical habitat).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (explaining purpose of ESA); Broderick, supra note
26, at 99 (noting FWS's disregard for critical habitat designations); John Kostyack
& Dan Rohlf, ConservingEndangered Species in an Era of Global Warming, 38 ENvrTL. L.
REP. NEWs & ANALYSIS 10203, 10208 (2008) (discussing FWS's practice of obstructing implementation of unoccupied critical habitat designations).
44. Critical Habitat: Questions and Answers, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 1
(ex(2003), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CH-qanda.pdf
plaining why FWS fails to designate critical habitat concurrent to species' listing).
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habitat designations must follow the APA's notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, which can be resource-intensive. 45 Pursuant to these procedures, the FWS must develop "detailed maps of
species' habitats, provide time for public comment, and complete
economic analyses of the critical habitat designation before [the
designation] can be finalized." 46
The FWS places a low priority on designations because it disagrees with the value Congress placed on critical habitat; the
Agency believes the critical habitat designation process is similar to
many of the ESA's other habitat protections and is therefore redundant.4 7 Despite the FWS's reluctance, courts repeatedly enforce
this provision of the ESA by ordering the FWS to designate critical
habitats at the time of listing.4 8 Further, courts have held that even
when the FWS is short on resources, critical habitat designation is
non-discretionary.4 9
For an example of the FWS's reluctance, see Final Designation of Critical Habitat
for the Mexican Spotted Owl, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 31, 2004) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). In that rule designating critical habitat for the Mexican Spotted Owl, the FWS explained that designation "provides little real conservation benefit, is driven by litigation and the courts rather than biology, limits [the FWS's]
ability to fully evaluate the science involved, consumes enormous agency resources,
and imposes huge social and economic costs." Id.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012) (requiring notice and comment); Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generation ofEnvironmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21, 37-38
(2001) [hereinafter A New Generation] (explaining challenges with rulemaking);
CriticalHabitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 1 (believing critical habitat
designations are burdensome on FWS).
46. Critical Habitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 1 (discussing resource costs of critical habitat designations).
47. Id. (explaining why critical habitat was low priority). The FWS claims,
"active conservation measures are far more important" than critical habitat designations. Id. Less expensive and time-intensive measures can be taken to ensure
landowners protect listed species while maintaining cooperation between the
Agency and landowners. Id. By reading the legislative history of the ESA, however,
Congress has made plain that "the preservation of a species' habitat is essential to
the preservation of the species itself." Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F.
Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (D. Ariz. 2003).
48. See Critical Habitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 1 (discussing
court-ordered deadlines); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245
F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding FWS's decision not to designate critical habitat
for Gulf Sturgeon was arbitrary and capricious in violation of APA); Ctr.for BiologicalDiversity, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (finding FWS under-designated critical habitat
for Mexican spotted owl); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
248 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting FWS interpretation of "adverse
modification"); see also Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
616 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding critical habitat designation for fifteen
threatened or endangered vernal pool species challenged by industry groups).
49. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative
Law, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 923, 952 (2008) (stating courts compel agency action even
when acting would be cost prohibitive). See also CriticalHabitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 1 (discussing court-ordered deadlines).
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The ESA's Citizen-Suit Provision

One of the ESA's most controversial, yet powerful, aspects is
the citizen-suit provision found in Section Eleven, which authorizes
any person to commence a civil suit against the Agency.50 The provision effectively empowers citizens to become involved in the listing process, including critical habitat designations for listed
species.5 1 Congress included this provision because of a concern
"that political pressure might discourage the agencies from listing
species that warranted protection."52 Instead, Congress opted to
give citizens and citizen groups the ability to compel the FWS to act

on its non-discretionary duties under the ESA. 5 3 Citizens are eligible for declaratory and injunctive relief, civil penalties, and attorneys' fees and litigation costs. 5 4
Citizens can bring citizen-suit claims for numerous ESA violations.5 5 Frequently, citizens request that the FWS list a species as
50. 16 U.S.C. § l540(g) (1) (2012) (permitting citizens to bring suit against
administrators of ESA); BerryJ. Brosi & Eric G.N. Biber, Citizen Involvement in the
U.S. EndangeredSpecies Act, Sci., 802 (Aug. 17, 2012), available at http://www.biologi
caldiversity.org/programs/biodiversity/-endangered-species-act/listing-species
undertheendangeredspecies act/pdfs/brosi-08-17-12.pdf (analyzing ESA citizen petitions). "Person" is defined in the ESA as:
[A]n individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other
private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political
subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
51. 16 U.S.C. § l540(g)(1) (authorizing citizen-suits for listing decisions);
Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 802 (studying value of citizen petitions).
52. Eric Biber, A Risky FWS Proposalto Limit ESA Petitions,LEGAL PLANET (Apr.
4, 2011), http://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/04/04/a-risky-fws-proposal-tolimit-esa-petitions/ (noting Congress' motivations in permitting citizen involvement); accord Daggett, supra note 31, at 99-102 (describing Congress' reasoning for
creating citizen petition process). In Bennett v. Spear,Justice Scalia articulated that
the citizen-suit provision of the ESA was "an authorization of remarkable breadth."
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997) (holding zone-of-interests test for prudential standing did not exclude irrigation districts and ranchers).
53. See Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 797 F. Supp. 2d 949,
952 (D. Ariz. 2011) (requiring plaintiff to show that Agency failed to take nondiscretionary action to bring citizen-suit); Conservation Force v. Salazar, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring plaintiffs to identify non-discretionary
duty under Section Four to compel agency action through citizen-suit provision).
54. Daggett, supra note 31, at 102 (describing available legal remedies for citizen-suits). Congress allowed recovery on attorneys' fees because it wanted to compel citizens to get involved without being deterred by the cost of litigation. Id.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 154 0(g) (1) (A)-(C) (listing available actions for citizen-suit
claims). Three types of actions for citizen-suit claims exist: (1) "to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other government instrumentality or
agency . .. who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter [thirty-
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endangered or threatened under the ESA through a citizen petition. 5 6 The citizen-suit provision then allows citizens to sue the
FWS to compel agency action if (1) the agency does not comply
with the strict ESA deadlines requiring the FWS to respond to the
citizen's petition or to complete a nondiscretionary task, or (2) the
petitioner is dissatisfied that the FWS rejected the petition.5 7
When the FWS receives a petition to list a species, it must adhere to the deadlines outlined in Section Four.5 8 The FWS is given
ninety days to determine whether the species' listing may be warranted.5 9 This determination centers on "whether the petition
presents substantial scientific or commercial information indicating
that the petitioned action may be warranted."6 0 If the FWS finds
the petition brings sufficient evidence signaling the species' listing
is warranted, it must conduct a full investigation to determine
whether the species should be listed and must respond to the citizen petition within one year of receipt.6 ' Once investigations are
complete, the FWS then makes a final listing determination and
either concludes that (1) listing is not warranted, (2) listing is warranted, or (3) listing is warranted, but the species is precluded from
listing because other species have higher priority for federal protection. 6 2 If listing is warranted, the FWS has an additional year to
publish a proposed rule on the species' listing.6 3 Because courts
consider listing decision deadlines to be non-discretionary and are

five] or regulation issued under the authority thereof;" (2) "to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant to section 1 53 5(g) (2) (B) (ii) of this title, the prohibitions
set forth in or authorized pursuant to section 1533(d) or 1538(a) (1) (B) of this
title with respect to the taking of any resident endangered species or threatened
species within any State;" or (3) "against the Secretary where there is alleged a
failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of this title
which is not discretionary with the Secretary." Id.
56. See Biber, supra note 52 (discussing citizen petition); Listing and Critical
Habitat: Petition Process, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/listing-petition-process.html (last updated July 15, 2013) (explaining citizen petition process).
57. Biber, supra note 52 (discussing citizen petition).
58. For a discussion of ESA deadlines, see infra notes 59-64 and accompanying
text.
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (3) (A) (giving Secretary ninety days after petition to
determine whether petition is warranted).
60. Id. (marking standards for determining whether petition is warranted).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (3) (B) (i-iii) (listing Secretary's possible findings after
investigation).
62. Id. (listing three findings Secretary may make in final listing
determination).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (6) (A) (giving deadline for publishing listing in Federal Register).
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likely to enforce them, citizens have significant power to compel
the FWS to list petitioned species. 64
C.

Availability of Judicial Review Under the APA

The APA governs judicial review of federal administrative agencies. 6 5 A citizen who brings a citizen-suit against the FWS for the
Agency's failure to perform a non-discretionary action does so
under the APA. 6 6 Often, a dissatisfied individual or group will
bring suit seeking judicial review of the FWS's determination not to
list a species or designate a critical habitat.6 7 Under the APA, a
reviewing court must inquire whether the agency's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."6 8 During this inspection, many courts apply a "hard look" review of the agency's
decision-making process, a review steeped in skepticism of the
agency's action.69
While the hard look review standard affords deference to
agency action, it probes the agency's decision-making.7 0 A court
64. For a discussion of citizen-suits, see infra notes 79-113 and accompanying
text.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2012) (listing judicial review standards).
66. Id. (providing for judicial review of agency action); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(allowing citizens to bring lawsuit against agency).
67. For a discussion ofjudicial review, see infra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (describing standard of judicial review).
69. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52-57 (1983) (finding National Highway Traffic Safety Administration was arbitrary and capricious when it revoked standard requiring passive
restraints in automobiles because it failed to provide reasoned analysis). Originally, this arbitrary and capricious standard was very deferential and easy for agencies to meet. See id. Now, however, many courts apply a stricter standard that is
often referred to as "hard look" review. A New Generation, supra note 45, at 36.
Courts originally intended hard look review to mean courts had the power to require agencies to take a "'hard look' at salient aspects of [the agency's] decision
problem." Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "HardLook"Judicial
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 753, 754 n.1 (2006). Courts today have re-appropriated
the term to mean "that courts are supposed to take a 'hard look' at the agency's
decision process." Id. In other words, hard look review requires that agencies give
an adequate explanation of their decision-making process including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." Burlington Truck
Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). This higher level ofjudicial scrutiny likely came from the judicial branch's desire to add a needed judicial check on
administrative agencies. Stephenson, supra, at 754.
70. For a discussion of hard look review, see supra notes 65-69 and infra notes
71-73 and accompanying text. Administrative law scholars are divided on whether
hard look review provides a good model for judicial review of administrative agencies. Stephenson, supra note 69, at 761-67. Proponents argue hard look review
encourages agencies to heighten decision-making standards, increases agency efficiency, corrects for any agency bias, and ensures quality in regulatory decisions. Id.
at 761-63. Opponents, however, assert hard look review of an agency's "formalized
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must not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency."7 1 Instead,
the court must evaluate "whether the [agency's] decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment."7 2 Because the hard look review
standard does not extend automatic deference to agency decisionmaking, those seeking judicial review have an opportunity to convince the court to vacate the agency's decision.73
III.

CURRENT TRENDS IN LITIGATION AND FEDERAL
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS

The ESA is a source of contentious litigation concerning listing
decisions and critical habitat designations.7 4 Environmental organizations, such as WildEarth Guardians, the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD), and Earthjustice, regularly petition the FWS to act
and initiate lawsuits against the Agency when it misses the ESA's
statutory deadlines to respond to the petitions.7 5 ESA opponents
often respond to FWS action by challenging the FWS's determinations under the APA as arbitrary and capricious.7 6 The FWS's response to current litigation patterns has been to insist on a cap for
the amount of funding it receives for its listing program from the
statements of reasons offered in an administrative record" does not correlate to
the agency's real decision-making process. Id. at 763. Opponents also argue hard
look review allows judges to "strike down policies they dislike on substantive
grounds," despite case precedent urging that a court must not impose its own judgment over the agency's judgment. Id. at 765; accord Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). For critics of hard look review, the
standard ultimately fails to contribute to effective decision-making and wastes excessive amounts of agency resources. See Stephenson, supra note 69, at 764-65.
Despite differences in opinion, however, courts are likely to stick with the current
trend in using hard look review when reviewing administrative agency action. See
generally id.
71. Overton Park,401 U.S. at 416 (asserting court may not impose its own judgment on agency decision-making).
72. Id. (explaining court may look at various factors to determine whether
agency was arbitrary and capricious). In State Farm, the Supreme Court further
stated that to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard, an "agency must examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." State Farm, 463
U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
73. For a discussion of how judicial review is used in court for ESA claims, see
infra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of current litigation patterns, see infra notes 79-146 and
accompanying text.
75. For a discussion of citizen-suits, see infra notes 79-113 and accompanying
text.
76. For a discussion of current trends in judicial review, see infra notes 114146 and accompanying text.
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federal government.7 7 The tension between frequent litigation and
a lack of adequate funding plays out at the direct expense of at-risk
species because the reversal of agency action removes federal protection for that species.7 8
A.

Save The Animals! Save The Animals! Save The Animals!

The ESA mandates the FWS to consider citizen petitions requesting the Agency to list a species, designate a critical habitat, or
comply with ESA deadlines.79 If the Agency denies the citizen petition, petitioners can react with lawsuits to force the FWS to act.8 0
Because the ESA grants broad authority to citizens to influence the
FWS's listing agenda, citizens "wield substantial power" in the environmental protection realm.8 1 Environmental organizations acting
as "citizens" under the ESA "have taken up their role as watchdogs
and enforcers with enthusiasm, and now, arguably, have assumed at
least some of the fundamental functions of the federal government,
particularly the executive power."8 2
Citizen groups can have a considerable impact on environmental lawmaking through litigation.8 3 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have initiated many seminal environmental law cases
through citizen petitions and judicial review.84 For example, in
77. For a discussion of the FWS's response to challenges to its decision-making under the ESA, see infra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
78. For a discussion of result of competing litigation patterns, see infra notes
172-179 and accompanying text.
79. See Helen Thompson, Citizen ProvisionFound Beneficial to US EndangeredSpecies Act, NATURE NEWS BLOG (Aug. 16, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://blogs.nature.com/
news-/2012/08/citizen-provision-found-beneficial-to-us-endangered-speciesact.html (acknowledging FWS's requirement to consider citizen petitions). For a
general historical background on why citizen petitions are a part of federal environmental protection, see Daggett, supra note 31, at 99-101 (giving background
information on citizen petition).
80. See Thompson, supra note 79 (noting citizen group trend in bringing lawsuits after petition).
81. Daggett, supra note 31, at 99 (explaining role citizens play in environmental protection).
82. Id. at 102 (describing citizens as "watchdogs" of ESA). One environmental organizations, Defenders of Wildlife, spells out its role in the ESA:
We develop new ways to make the act more effective, advocate to protect
and increase federal funding for the ESA, oppose all legislative attacks
that would weaken the law, and make sure that those responsible for implementing the Act's provisions and regulations are held accountable
when they fail to enforce the law.
EndangeredSpecies Act 101, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, http://www.defenders.org/en
dangered-species-act/endangered-species-act (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
83. Daggett, supra note 31, at 103 (explaining NGO role in lawmaking).
84. Id. at 102-05 (articulating NGO role in citizen-initiated litigation). See,
e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971) (granting
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Overton Park v. Volpe,85 NGOs successfully petitioned the United
States Department of Transportation to stop construction of a highway through Overton Park, a 342-acre city park containing nature
trails, forest area, and other natural landscape.8 6 Citizen groups,
furthermore, are well-known for enforcing the ESA by exposing instances when the FWS disregards its own rules.87

Opponents criticize the ESA citizen-suit clause, claiming it impedes the ESA's success by "becom [ing] a tool for excessive litigation." 8 Critics argue that citizen petitions force the FWS to spend
its limited resources combating mega-petitions and their resulting
litigation instead of focusing on species conservation.8 9 According
to FWS Director Dan Ashe, the FWS spent more than seventy-five

percent of its resource-management budget on litigation related expenses in 2011.90
Citizen petitions and related suits involving the ESA have increased substantially and without precedent in recent years. 9 ' In
the last four years, a small number of environmental groups have
submitted over twelve hundred petitions for species to be listed an exponential jump from the twenty-species average of the past
twelve years.9 2 These groups attribute the recent overhaul in petitions to an increase in mass species extinctions resulting from critical habitat destruction and climate change; they assert entire
ecosystems are in need of protection, not just individual species.9 3

citizens' petition by halting construction of highway through city park); Sierra
Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 436, 445 (5th Cir. 2001) (providing
win for citizen groups by emphasizing critical habitat important for environmental
species conservation).
85. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
86. Id. at 406 (halting construction of six-lane highway).
87. Daggett, supra note 31, at 105 (describing NGOs' well-known role as
whistleblowers and watchdogs).
88. Rep. Doc Hastings, Time to Improve the Endangered Species Act, WASH. TIMES
(May 18, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/18/time-toimprove-the-endangered-species-act/ (noting citizen petitions are harmfully increasing litigation against FWS).
89. See id. (explaining how petitions hinder FWS).
90. See id. (noting FWS Director Dan Ashe's statement on litigation related
expenditures).
91. Todd Woody, Wildlife at Risk FaceLong Line at US. Agency, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr.
20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/science/earth/21species.html?_
r=0 (explaining recent surge in citizen petitions).
92. Id. (highlighting unusually high number of recent petitions requested).
93. Id. (explaining petitioners' rationale for dramatic increase in requests).
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In 2011, the FWS reached a settlement agreement with the
CBD and WildEarth Guardians. 9 4 The CBD and WildEarth Guardians agreed to halt lawsuits that involved over two hundred and fifty
species in exchange for a six-year plan to investigate possible aid to
the species.9 5 This settlement afforded little relief to the FWS, however, because inJuly 2012, the CBD brought another mega-petition
requesting the FWS list fifty-three amphibians and reptiles.9 6
The FWS maintains mega-petitions are a challenge for the
Agency because of the significant costs and human capital resources required to investigate the petitioners' claims.9 7 According
to Gary Frazer, the FWS's assistant director for the Endangered Species Program:
These megapetitions are putting [the FWS] in a difficult
spot, and they're basically going to shut down [the FWS's]
ability to list any candidates for the foreseeable future ....
If all our resources are used responding to petitions, we
don't have resources to put species on the endangered
species list. It's not a happy situation.9 8
The entire purpose of the ESA is undermined if the FWS cannot
continue to do its statutorily mandated job of listing species because it must spend its limited resources handling citizen petitions.99 The mega-petition problem is further exacerbated when
organizations seek to enforce ESA deadlines and thereby force the
FWS to reallocate resources to meet these deadlines.1 0 0

94. Thompson, supra note 79 (discussing recent settlement agreement between FWS, CBD, and WildEarth Guardians). The CBD and WildEarth Guardians
bring the largest portion of citizen petitions, filing "over 90 percent of the listings
petitions since 2007." Woody, supra note 91. For a discussion of the latest settlements, see Michael Wines, Endangered or Not, but at Least No Longer Waiting, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/science/earth-/longdelayed-rulings-on-endangered-species-are-coming.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O.
95. Thompson, supra note 79 (noting details of FWS's settlement agreement).
For details of this plan, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Listing Program Work Plan
Questions and Answers, U.S. FisH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endan
gered/improving-esa/FWS%20-Listing%2Program%2Work%2Plan%20FAQs
%20FINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
96. Thompson, supra note 79 (highlighting CBD's recent mega-petition).
97. Woody, supra note 91 (posing FWS's argument that mega-petitions harm
Agency).
98. Id. (quoting Gary Frazer on stunting mega-petitions).
99. See id. (noting petitions are problematic in light of budget constraints).
100. Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 928 (articulating problem with
administrative deadlines).
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Notably, the issue of citizens abusing the right to petition ap-

pears unique to the FWS. 0 1 The DOI is one of few federal agencies
that consistently receives many judicially imposed deadlines. 0 2 In
2008, the DOI "reported 209 judicial deadlines and 279 statutory
deadlines, suggesting an ongoing dispute with the courts" and by
implication with citizen petitioners. 0 3 Courts generally enforce
statutorily mandated deadlines, despite the Agency's lack of resources to meet a particular deadline.10 4 Accordingly, if the FWS
cannot meet the deadlines imposed by the ESA to respond to citizen petitions, it "will pretty much automatically lose in court and be
ordered by the court to respond within a short timeframe." 0 5
In addition to the mega-petition strategy, citizen petitioners
have also employed a "sue and settle" tactic involving what some
have called "secret settlements" with the FWS. 06 Secret settlements
occur when environmental groups that have brought mega-petitions settle listing determinations privately with the FWS, as demonstrated recently when the FWS agreed to list several hundred
species waiting on its backlog. 0 7 These settlements often deny
landowners and industry groups -

those most heavily affected by

the settlements - the opportunity to give input on the FWS's decisions.' 08 Secret settlements exclude important parties to the litigation, in effect not allowing landowners and industry groups to
"present any evidence, make any argument to the judge or react to
the proposed settlement in any way."1 09
101. For a discussion on the large number of petitions to the FWS, see infra
notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
102. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 940 (describing high numbers
ofjudicially imposed deadlines on DOI).
103. See id. (listing number of DOI's judicial and statutory deadlines).
104. Id. at 952 (referencing judicial trend to compel Agency to meet deadlines); accord Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (demonstrating how courts can use statutory deadlines to force agency action under
Section 706(1) of APA).
105. Biber, supra note 52 (noting judicial trend to compel FWS to comply
with deadlines).
106. Sen. David Vitter, EndangeredSpecies Act's Hidden Costs, WASH. TIMES (Feb.
8, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/8/endangered-species-acts-hidden-costs/ (describing sue and settle tactic). For a discussion on negotiated rulemaking, see A New Generation, supra note 45, at 87-94.
107. Vitter, supranote 106 (describing secret settlements). For a discussion of
recent settlements, see supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
108. Vitter, supra note 106 (explaining how landowners are left out of FWS
decision-making).
109. Id. (explaining legal problem with secret settlements). But see Taylor
Jones, Letter to the Editor: EndangeredSpecies Act Is Worth the Fight, WASH. TIMES (Feb.
21, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/21/endangeredspecies-act-is-worth-the-fight/ (countering Senator David Vitter). Jones articulates
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Thus, citizen petitions that lead to court ordered deadlines or
related backroom settlements greatly impact the FWS's agenda for
species and habitat conservation.' 1 0 The Agency, unfortunately, is
forced to reallocate its budget to address petitions, prepare for
court, and negotiate settlements. 11 If the FWS is ordered to meet a
deadline, it arguably does less effective work because it is rushed
and constrained by a budget. 112 Challenges for judicial review,
therefore, logically follow from citizen petitions and related citizensuits. 113

B.

This Land is My Land

The FWS incurs substantial opposition to species listings and
critical habitat designations from landowners and industry
groups.' 4 These groups "continue to regard ESA enforcement as a
potentially debilitating regulatory straightjacket."' 15 Economic factors are an important reason why these groups disfavor the ESA;
landowners and industry groups "see ESA restrictions as a threat to
the profitable use of their land."1 1 6 To avoid the potential financial
loss from compliance with the ESA, landowners and industry
groups seek judicial review of the FWS's listings and critical habitat
designations to ask the court to set aside the action.1 17
The ESA's mandatory protections for listed species and critical
habitats can significantly constrain a landowner's use of his or her
backdoor settlement agreements have "streamlined the listing process, reduced
litigation, provided regulatory certainty for public and private land users and
spurred crucial protection for our nation's most imperiled plants and animals." Id.
110. For a discussion of problems arising from citizen petitions, see supra
notes 79-109 and infra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
111. See Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptionsfor the EndangeredSpecies Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 472 (2004) (articulating Agency must reallocate resources from its priorities to deal with litigation). For a discussion of the FWS's
resource allocation, see infra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
112. For a discussion of how the FWS is constrained by deadlines and budget,
see infra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of trends in judicial review, see infra notes 114-146 and
accompanying text.
114. See CHARLs E. GILLILAND & MICHAEL MAY, TEX. A&M UNV., ENDANGERED SPECIEs Acr: A LANDOWNER's GUIDE 1 (2003), available at http://recenter
.tamu.edu/pdf/-1648.pdf (discussing trend in challenging ESA decisions).
115. Id. (explaining landowner problems with ESA).
116. Id. (noting ESA makes certain land use unprofitable).
117. See Susan Combs, PreservingEndangered Species the Texas Way, WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/28/preserving-endangered-species-the-texas-way/
(explaining how disgruntled industry
groups and landowners turn to courts when mega-petitions encourage FWS to take
action according to environmentalist agenda).
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property.' 18 For example, it is illegal under Section Nine of the Act
to "take" a listed species.1 19 "Take" is defined broadly by the FWS
to include any activity that "actually kills or injures wildlife" and can
occur if the activity causes harm directly or indirectly. 120 For example, an illegal taking may occur when a landowner wishes to develop or use a property in any way other than as a habitat for the
endangered or threatened species.12 1 Violators of the ESA's taking
provision could face civil and criminal penalties. 12 2
While listings may recover certain species, they also have the
potential to destroy entire industries and the communities that rely
on them.123 For example, in 1990, the FWS listed the Northern
Spotted Owl as a threatened species because it believed the logging
industry was jeopardizing the owl's survival. 124 Since then, over two
hundred logging mills in the Pacific Northwest have closed and
thousands of logging employees have lost their jobs because the industry cannot exist while FWS regulations protecting the owl's
habitat are in place.125 To make matters worse, Northern Spotted
Owl populations have not recovered and may still be declining; new
evidence released by the FWS indicates the primary threat to the
Northern Spotted Owl's survival is actually competition from an118. GILLILND & MAY, supra note 114, at 1 (explaining ESA restrictions on
landowners). Housing developers, for example, "who build near endangered species can be required by the Clean Water Act and other measures to acquire federal
permits and to avoid adversely affecting imperiled wildlife .. .. [A]cquiring permits is lengthy and complex, and the definition of adverse impact [is] vague."
Wines, supra note 94.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012) (forbidding taking of species).
120. See GILLILAND & MAY, supra note 114, at 1, 4 (describing "take" provision
of Section Nine of ESA); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.,
55 U.S. 687, 704-05 (1995) (allowing FWS's broad interpretation of "take"). The
ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(19).
121. GILLILAND & MAY, supra note 114, at 2 (describing landowner action that
may result in a taking). Landowners can apply for permits to escape liability from
incidental takings. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 2 (explaining penalties for landowners who take species). The civil
penalties range from $25,000 to $50,000 per take. Id. The criminal penalties may
include a prison sentence of up to one year. Id.
123. Combs, supra note 117 (explaining demise of logging industry as result
of ESA regulation). Combs notes, "Heavy-handed federal regulation can put some
of our communities on the endangered list, hurting local industries as well as government finances." Id.
124. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26114-01 (June 26,
1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing Northern Spotted Owl as
threatened). See Combs, supra note 117 (noting Northern Spotted Owl listing and
impact on logging industry).
125. Combs, supra note 117 (describing downfall of logging industry).
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other species, the Barred Owl.12 6 The Northern Spotted Owl,
therefore, is an example of how a listing decision could negatively
impact an entire industry and still fail to achieve its purpose of protecting the listed species.1 27
The cattle grazing industry is another major source of tension
for the FWS.' 28 The FWS has listed many species under the ESA
due to threats from overgrazing by permitted cattle grazers in the
western United States. 129 Cattle grazers are opposed to these listings because the imposed regulation hinders their ability to profit
from livestock grazing.13 0 In many areas of the Southwest, "livestock grazing . .. is not economically viable at environmentally sus-

tainable levels."1 3 1 Grazers maintain that other external factors,
such as other wildlife, recreational users, and land developers, are
the true threat to species' existence. 3 2 For several decades, cattle
grazers have instigated lawsuits to restrict the FWS's listing program
and have been successful in getting courts to set aside or limit FWS
action. 3 3
126. Id. (asserting ESA regulation affecting logging industry unnecessary because Northern Spotted Owl population is still declining).
127. Id. (explaining how industry could have survived without listing).
128. Daggett, supra note 31, at 105-08 (describing cattle grazing industry's effect on endangered species and resulting litigation). See Arizona Rancher's Legal
Defense Fund Litigation Raffle, ARIZ. CATrLEMEN Ass'N, http://azcattlemensassoc
.org/litigation.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (discussing history of cattle growers'
litigation). For an in-depth analysis of cattle grazing litigation, see Harold S. Shepherd, The Future of Livestock Grazing and the Endangered Species Act, 21 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIc. 383, 408-24 (2006) (providing details of ESA lawsuit).
129. Daggett, supra note 31, at 105-06 (explaining problem with overgrazing
for endangered and threatened species).
130. Id. (articulating grazers' economic motivations for fighting against listing
decisions).
131. Id. (describing economic downside for cattle growers if they must consider presence of endangered species).
132. Erik LeDuc, Cattle Grower's Association Protests Potential Endangered Species
Listing oflNew Mexico Meadow jumping Mouse, RuIDoso NEws (July5, 2013, 8:04 AM),
http://www.ruidosonews.com/ci_23603576/cattle-growers-association-protests-po
tential-endangered-species-listing?source=most emailed (discussing cattle growers'
perspective on ESA). Rex Wilson, president of the New Mexico Cattle Growers
Association, stated:
Environmental activist groups like to blame everything on overgrazing,
but that's seldom the problem. Riparian areas are few and far between in
New Mexico, attracting wildlife, recreational users, developers and more.
Under the ESA, about the only thing that the [FWS] can effectively restrict is grazing, which is frustrating for those of us who are out on the
ground, caring for the land on a daily basis.
Id.
133. See Daggett, supra note 31, at 105-06 (describing cattle grazers' litigation); see, e.g., Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d
1229, 1251 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding FWS arbitrary and capricious in issuing incidental take statements and failing to specify amount of excessive take); Ariz. Cattle
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The latest settlement agreements between the FWS and environmental groups have further aggravated the dispute between
landowners, industry groups, and the FWS.' 3 4 If the FWS were to
list the eight hundred or more species it has agreed to consider for
listing, endangered species would inhabit substantially more territory than they do now and affect more property. 13 5 In light of the
size of potentially affected property and past judicial review trends,
landowners and industry groups will likely flood the courts with
suits challenging the listings. 13 6 An increase in lawsuits would only
fuel animosity between the competing interest groups and cause
the FWS to expend even greater resources to manage the increase
in litigation.1 3 7
When landowners and industry groups challenge agency action, they often argue under the APA that the FWS was arbitrary
and capricious in its decision-making.1 38 Many courts will exercise
hard look review to examine whether the FWS considered all necessary factors when making its decision.1 39 When the FWS rushes to
meet statutory deadlines for agency action, the action is often of
poor quality and thus fails under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.' 40 The FWS is thus likely to lose its judicial review
suit when it rushes to meet deadlines for listing species and
designating critical habitats in response to environmental group
petitions. 14 1
Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding FWS was
not arbitrary and capricious in designation of critical habitat for Mexican spotted
owl).
134. See Wines, supra note 94 (discussing developer and industry groups' discontent with latest settlements).
135. Id. (explaining growth of endangered species list and potential sixty percent increase in territory).
136. Id. (describing resistance to ESA listings).
137. Id. (explaining likelihood that landowners and industry groups will bring
challenges to listing decisions). The FWS has already seen backlash from industry
groups, such as the petroleum industry's complaints on listing the lesser prairie
chicken and the Gunnison sage grouse. Id.
138. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 963 (explaining arbitrary and
capricious standard in light of judicial review).
139. See id. (explaining courts' approach to challenges of agency action under
arbitrary and capricious standard). For a discussion of hard look review in judicial
review cases, see supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text. See also Holly Doremus,
The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science
Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 430 (2004) [hereinafter Best Available Science Mandate]
(describing trends in judicial review for best available science requirement).
140. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 963 (articulating problem with
rushed agency action and arbitrary and capricious review).
141. Id. (describing how rushed agency action leads to lost suits against those
claiming agency was arbitrary and capricious).
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The ESA appears to receive harsher review than other statutes.142 According to environmental scholar Holly Doremus, "In
the ESA context, judicial review has been far from a rubber stamp.
Indeed, courts have been far tougher than scientific peer review on
the wildlife agencies."14 3 For example, when reviewing listing determinations, courts take a hard look at the FWS's scientific evidence on species and habitats and often find the evidence fails the
best available science standard outlined in the ESA's Section
Four.14 4 Twenty-five of a sample of thirty-two listing decisions reviewed by the court in 2003 were set aside for reasons including the
FWS's failure to use the best available science.145 In contrast, courts
afford a noticeable level of deference to other agencies for technical decision-making related to scientific evidence.14 6
C.

Money Doesn't Grow on Trees

In recent years, the FWS has requested that Congress cap the
FWS's budget for citizen petitions.14 7 This budget cap proposal
asks "Congress to intervene and impose a limit on the number of
species it must consider for protection" and would only increase the
tension between competing interest groups, including the FWS, if
granted.14 8 Despite prior proposals failing in 2001 and 2011, the
FWS is likely to continue to request that Congress artificially limit
the FWS's ability to respond to citizen petitions. 4 9 President
Obama's 2013 budget proposal for the FWS included a listing pro142. See Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 139, at 431 (discussing more
stringent judicial review for ESA).
143. Id. (discussing enhanced judicial review of ESA action).
144. Id. (describing judicial review of best available science standard). For a
discussion of the best available science mandate, see supranote 37 and accompanying text.
145. Id. (describing statistics ofjudicial review ruling against agency for listing
decisions).
146. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
103 (1983) (deferring to agency's decision-making based on scientific evidence).
In Balt. Gas & Elec., the Supreme Court stated "a reviewing court must remember
that the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission is making predictions, within its area of
special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must
generally be at its most deferential." Id.
147. For a discussion of the FWS's requested budget caps, see infra notes 148171 and accompanying text.
148. Woody, supra note 91 (noting significance of FWS's request for budget
cap).
149. Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 802 (predicting FWS's intent on ESA
budget cuts).
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gram cap of $1.5 million ceiling out of the FWS's $22,431,000
budget for response to citizen petitions.15 0
This budget cap request carries "legal significance because the
[FWS] routinely struggles to meet court deadlines dealing with ESA
issues" and the FWS could use its inadequate funding as a legal defense to stall for more time.1 5 1 Courts enforce the ESA by requiring
the FWS to meet the ESA's deadlines and by extending court orders
when the FWS fails to meet those deadlines. 152 If Congress approves a cap in the upcoming years, courts will need to recognize
that the FWS's delay in listing species or designating critical habitat
is "outside of [the FWS's] control."15 3
Presently, the FWS has a large backlog of in-need species that
cannot receive protection because the FWS lacks the necessary resources.1 54 A major reason for this backlog is that the FWS contrived its own lawful impediment for funding species protection
when it requested and received a budget cap from Congress for its
final listing decisions.' 5 5 The FWS's current proposal requests a
budget cap on the entire listing process, including a cap for citizen
petitions, because the FWS claims it cannot meet the demand of
existing warranted but precluded species.156
Even without the requested budget cap, the FWS has insufficient funding to meet its current demands. 5 7 The FWS's 2012
150. Bob Berwyn, Endangered Species Short-Shnfted in Federal Budget, SUMMIT
(Feb. 19, 2012), http://summitcountyvoice.com/2012/
02/19/endangered-species-short-shrifted-in-federal-budget/
(identifying dollar
amount of budget cap).
151. Lawrence Hurley, Obama Plan to Cap Fundingfor Endangered Species Act
Petitions Angers Litigants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2011/03/24/24-greenwire-obama-plan-to-cap-funding-for-endangeredspeci-79833.html (noting legal significance of Congress-imposed budget caps).
152. See id. (discussing budget caps as method to combat court ordered
deadlines).
153. Id. (quoting Gary Frazer, Assistant Director for Endangered Species,
FWS on budget cap). The FWS views the budget caps as a "common-sense approach" to balancing agency priorities. Id.
154. Biber, supra note 52 (discussing FWS backlog).
155. See id. (discussing current budget cap on finalizing listing decisions).
156. See id. (explaining FWS's motivation for budget cap on citizen petitions).
To put the FWS's costs in perspective, the FWS spends nearly $400,000 on critical
habitat designations and about half as much on listing a species. CriticalHabitat:
Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 3 (noting costs of species' listing and critical habitat designation).
157. For a discussion of why the FWS has inadequate funding, see supra notes
147-156 and infra notes 158-171 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
FWS's budget, see Donald C. Baur, Michael J. Bean & Wm. Robert Irvin, A Recovery
Planfor the EndangeredSpecies Act, 39 ENvrL. L. REP. NEWs & ANALYSIS 10006, 1001012 (2009) (detailing ESA budget problems).
COUNTY CITIZENS VOICE
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budget request for the endangered species listing program was
$24.6 million, an eleven percent increase from fiscal year 2011.158
Leading environmental scholar Daniel J. Rohlf has argued, however, this increase will still be grossly inadequate to support the
FWS's responsibilities under the ESA.159 According to Rohlf, "[i]n
an age of accelerating threats to biodiversity, not just from habitat
loss from invasive species and climate change, the budgets for Fish
and Wildlife Service have not even been close to keeping up with
the demands on the agency."o6 0 To put the Agency's costs into perspective, the FWS spends an average of $39,267 for a ninety-day
finding that a species warrants listing and an average of $100,690
for a twelve-month finding.1 6 1
Furthermore, it is unlikely the Agency will receive adequate
funding in the upcoming years.16 2 On March 1, 2013, a sequestration period took effect because both Congressional Republicans
and Democrats could not agree on a compromise to reduce the
federal deficit.16 3 During the 2013 sequestration, the federal government was forced to cut nearly eighty-five billion dollars from
federal spending to stabilize the budget deficit.16 4 To meet this target, the sequester made across-the-board federal spending cuts.' 6 5
In December of 2013, Congress passed a federal spending plan that
took away the forced spending cuts from the sequestration. 16 6 Although President Obama has stated that the budget compromise
was "a good first step away from the shortsighted, crisis-driven decision-making that has only served to act as a drag on our economy,"

158. See Woody, supra note 91 (discussing FWS's budget).
159. See id. (asserting Daniel J. Rohlf's critique of FWS's budget request).
160. See id. (quoting Daniel J. Rohlf).
161. Heather Hansen, Swapping Politicsfor Science, HIGH COUNTRY NEWs (May
2, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/range/swapping-politics-for-science
(noting price of listing and protecting species is high).
162. Sean Reilly, OMB: Plan for Hundreds of Thousands of Furloughs if Budget
Deal Fails, FED. TIMEs (Jan. 14, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130114/-PERSONNEL03/301140007/OMB-Plan-hundreds-thousands-furloughs-budget-deal-fails (explaining United States' tough financial situation).
163. Josh Lederman, Sequestration 2013: With Cuts in Place, Obama and GOP
Bracefor Next Fight, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2013, 6:03 AM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2013/-03/02/sequestration-2013_n_2796289.html (explaining 2013
sequester).
164. Id. (discussing causes of March 2013 sequester).

165. Id. (describing sequestration).
166. Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Approves Budget, Sends to Obama, CNN
(last up.coM, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/18/politics/senate-budget-deal/
dated Dec. 18, 2013) (explaining 2013 budget compromise).
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it remains to be seen how this budget compromise will affect federal agencies like the DOI.16 7
Because the FWS is already facing a grave financial crisis, its
solution to cap funding to reduce the amount of citizen petitions is
counterintuitive in that it limits the FWS's resources even further.168 The request runs contrary to the spirit of the ESA: The
FWS is statutorily mandated to list species and protect them by
designating critical habitats, and the FWS deliberately fails to meet
this mandate when it keeps itself from funds to protect species. 6 9
Currently, the polarized agendas of environmental groups and
their counterpart landowner and industry groups force the FWS to
reallocate funding necessary for its listing program to meet the
costs of appeasing both sides, but the FWS's solution to cap the
budget may not ultimately resolve the FWS's dilemma.170 Notably,
environmentalists, landowners, and industry groups all disfavor the
FWS's proposed budget cap because they think it functions as another excuse for the FWS to remain inactive on pending ESA petitions or challenges to listing. 7 1
D.

Going Around in Circles

The combination of citizen-involved petitions, suits brought to
compel FWS action, and litigation requesting judicial review of FWS
action presents "a difficult dilemma for the agency."1 72 Citizen
groups have ignited a surge in wildlife protection efforts by bring167. Id. (quoting President Obama) (noting compromise is helpful for economic stability); accord Lisa Desjardins, Budget deal: who wins, who loses?, cNN.cOM,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/-12/17/politics/budget-winners-losers/index.html
(last updated Dec. 18, 2013) (explaining how more than one trillion dollars will be
divided among agencies).
168. For a discussion of why the FWS's budget cap request is illogical, see
supra notes 147-169 and accompanying text.
169. For a discussion of why the FWS has inadequate funding to meet its statutory mandates, see supra notes 147-169 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of the FWS's litigation and resulting resource dilemma,
see infra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
171. Hurley, supra note 151 (discussing groups who disfavor FWS's budget
cap request). Environmental groups dislike the budget cap proposal because it
reduces the amount of money needed for adequate listing procedures. Id. Opponents of new listings, such as landowners and industry groups, argue that this will
provide the FWS with an excuse to get out of court, rather than resolve pending
suits. Id.
172. See Broderick, supranote 26, at 100 (explaining time constraint quandary
for FWS). Legal scholar Richard B. Stewart noted, "[r] egulation is widely regarded
as a zero-sum game in which lawyer-mercenaries battle in an interest group struggle from which only the lawyers profit." Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 655, 65556 (1985) [hereinafter The Discontents of Legalism].
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ing thousands of citizen petitions asking the FWS to list a species or
designate a critical habitat.17 3 Additionally, these environmental
groups continuously and successfully sue the FWS to force compliance with the ESA's short time frames for listing species and
designating critical habitats.1 74 Because the FWS already has a limited budget, it has only two options to meet court ordered deadlines: (1) risk the quality of work in order to achieve deadlines
timely, or (2) settle with environmental groups.1 75 Neither option
is optimal because both may result in a judicial review suit, risking
the possibility that the FWS's listing or designation will be set aside
in court. 176
This litigation pattern results in squandered resources and limited progress with respect to protecting endangered species. 17 7 The
FWS's dilemma is compounded by its request to cap funding for
addressing citizen involvement in the ESA process.1 78 In short, "the
FWS's already meager resources are wasted in its bureaucratic twostep through the courts, which is aimed at avoiding only the most
immediate problems."17 9
IV.

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO THE

FWS's CuRRENT

DILEMMA

The rising trend in mega-petitions and related lawsuits is harmful to endangered species because it siphons resources from "on173. Woody, supra note 91 (noting recent trend in rapid rise in petitions).
174. Broderick, supra note 26, at 100-01 (noting litigious behavior of environmental citizen groups that compel FWS action).
175. Id. (explaining FWS's race to complete work required by ESA petitions).
The FWS attempts to settle lawsuits with citizen petitioners to avoid the high costs
of litigation and therefore produces rushed or poorly conceived critical habitat
designations. Id. at 113-14. When an agency is forced to meet an unreasonably
demanding deadline, "a natural inference is that the quality of the output will be
sacrificed." Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 933. Thus, it is no surprise
when the quality of the FWS's listings fails to meet the procedural or substantive
standards outlined by Congress. See id. at 932-33.
176. Broderick, supra note 26, at 100-01 (highlighting common success of environmental groups in suits for judicial review of agency action).
177. Broderick, supra note 26, 101 (explaining how competing litigation strategies stunt FWS's species protection progress). The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is in a similar situation, as agencies administering it must balance
significant litigation burdens against underlying environmental goals. See generally
Kevin H. Moriarty, Circumventing the National Environmental Policy Act: Agency Abuse
of the CategoricalExclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2312 (2004).
178. For a discussion of FWS's budget caps, see supra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
179. Broderick, supra note 26, at 101 (concluding that wasted money and resources result from excess litigation by citizens). See CriticalHabitat: Questions and
Answers, supra note 44, at 2 (identifying continuous cycle of lawsuits challenging
and re-challenging critical habitat designations).
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the-ground conservation efforts" designed to protect species before
listing is needed and prevent those species already listed from becoming extinct. 8 0 The FWS, environmentalists, landowners, industry groups, and Congress find themselves in an intense debate over
whether the ESA needs to be reformed and, if so, in what fashion. 18 1 The following section explores whether the status quo is ineffective.' 8 2 It then proposes ways to increase the efficiency of the
ESA and better protect endangered and threatened species.18 3
A.

Does the ESA Need a Change of Scenery?

Some argue citizen petitions, however well-intentioned, promote serious and direct harm to endangered species.184 Recently,
however, scholars have questioned the premise that citizen petitions contribute to the FWS's failures. 8 5 In August 2012, researchers Berry J. Brosi and Eric G. N. Biber released an objective
scientific study of the effect of citizen petitions on the ESA. 8 6 The
study compared species listed by the FWS on its own initiative with
species listed as a result of citizen petition litigation.18 7 It investigated the biological threat to each species and determined that if
the biological threat to citizen-initiated species is higher than or
180. CriticalHabitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 2 (noting litigation is potentially detrimental to endangered species because ESA effectiveness
hits roadblock).
181. For a discussion of the debate surrounding ESA reform, see infra notes
233-292 and accompanying text.
182. For the pros and cons of the current system, see infra notes 233-292 and
accompanying text.
183. For a discussion of the circulating proposals for fixing the ESA, see infra
notes 233-292 and accompanying text.
184. For a discussion of critics' concerns about citizen petitions, see supra
notes 88-113 and infra notes 217-228 and accompanying text.
185. For a discussion of recent scholarship on the effectiveness of citizen petitions, see infra notes 186-232 and accompanying text.
186. Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 802 (studying citizen petitions for ESA).
For information on the study's scientific methods, see id. For a discussion of the
study, see Thompson, supra note 79 (explaining recent study on citizen-initiated
petitions).
187. Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 802 (establishing methodology for objective analysis of listed species litigation). Brosi and Biber's study asked three
questions:
(i) Do FWS-initiated species face greater biological threats than citizeninitiated species? (ii) Do citizen-initiated species show signs consistent
with what critics deem politically-motivated listing: (a) more conflict with
development than FWS-initiated species; and (b) a greater proportion of
subspecies or populations as opposed to 'full' species compared with
FWS-initiated species? (iii) What is the relation between biological threat
and both conflict with development and taxonomic status?
Id.
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equal to the biological threat for FWS-initiated species, citizen involvement under the ESA is productive.1 8 8 Such a finding would
confirm the need for preserving citizen involvement in the ESA
process.189 An alternate finding would suggest citizen involvement
hinders the FWS's ability to list species with the most need, or highest biological threat. 19 0
Brosi and Biber's study found "[c]itizen-initiated species (petitioned and/or litigated) face [d] higher levels of biological threat
9 It also found FWS-initiated spethan species identified by FWS."o'
cies were less likely than citizen-initiated species to conflict with development, although species in conflict with development were
found to face "greater biological threat levels than species not in
conflict with development."' 9 2 Based on these findings, the researchers concluded it would be illogical to "reduc[e] or
eliminat[e] citizen involvement in the ESA."19 3
Critics of citizen involvement charge that such petitions are politically motivated.19 4 They argue petitioners focus on species that
are more likely to be in conflict with development and therefore
unfairly target landowners and industry groups. 195 Although the
critics' claims may be grounded in some truth, Brosi and Biber's
study demonstrated citizen-initiated species do indeed have the
greatest need for preservation and may include biologically
threatened species not otherwise captured by FWS data and initiatives.19 6 Citizen-petitioned species, therefore, still warrant listing
188. Id. (articulating "biological threat" as threshold test for incurring benefits from citizen involvement).
189. Id. (asserting researchers' finding that citizen involvement is beneficial
for identifying biological threat supports maintaining citizen petition clause of
ESA).
190. Id. (suggesting if citizen-initiated species had lower biological threat than
FWS-initiated species, ESA is ineffective by allowing citizen petitions).
191. Id. (concluding citizen-initiated species suffer higher biological threat
than FWS-initiated species).
192. Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 802 (studying citizen-initiated species
affected by development and biological threat levels).
193. Id. at 803 (concluding citizen involvement beneficial to ESA purpose
and scope).
194. Id. at 802 (noting critics' argument that petitions are politically
motivated).
195. Id. (dispelling critics' concern that citizen group petitions are politically
motivated).
196. Id. at 803 (finding petitions warranted for species in conflict with development). But see Marco Restani & John M. Marzluff, FundingExtinction? Biological
Needs and PoliticalRealities in the Allocation of Resources to Endangered Species Recovery,
52 BIOSCIENCE 169, 174 (2002) (articulating that -citizens petitioned more
threatened species than endangered species); Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking
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under a biological threat criterion despite possible negative effects
on landowners and industry groups.19 7
Brosi and Biber's study further acknowledges that citizen
groups are particularly well-positioned to propose listing decisions
because citizen groups often have in-depth knowledge about a particular species and its habitat.198 Importantly, FWS assistant director Gary Frazer conceded "[c]itizen involvement is valuable and
useful" to the FWS.199 Indeed, many argue that the ESA's "improvements are not just the result of better laws - they are the
result of better enforcement, and most of that enforcement has
been at the hands of citizen groups."200
If Congress limits the ability of citizens to petition for species
listings or critical habitat designations, Congress further limits the
effectiveness of federal programs designed to protect a large number of species that are in need of environmental protection. 20 1
Without pressure from citizen petitioners, the FWS has a poor record of instigating listings and designating critical habitats.2 0 2 Although Congress mandated the FWS to prioritize listing decisions,
even when costs were heavy, the FWS has "moved at a glacial pace
in listing species as threatened or endangered" and has taken even
more time to designate critical habitats for these species. 203 Citizens have submitted thousands of petitions in response to the
FWS's delay in the listing process. 20 4 Although listing and critical
habitat designations are time-consuming and resource-heavy
processes, the petitioners forced the FWS to list approximately 650
species from 1990 to 2000.205 Thus, there is little doubt citizen petithe ESA to Reflect Human Dominion over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 490, 496 (asserting skepticism that environmentalists bring petitions for most at-risk species).
197. Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 802 (asserting citizen groups do petition
for most at-risk species).
198. Id. at 803 (noting citizen groups have particular knowledge necessary for
listing species).
199. Thompson, supra note 79 (quoting Gary Frazer of FWS on value of citizen involvement).
200. Daggett, supra note 31, at 100-01 (explaining NGOs' role in ESA
success).
201. See Brosi & Biber, supra note 50, at 803 (articulating need for citizen
involvement to preserve species). Importantly, citizen petitions prompt the FWS
to make determinations on species that may be unpopular choices for listing. Id.
202. See Daggett, supra note 31, at 109 (asserting that NGOs, rather than FWS,
are agenda setters).
203. Id. (describing FWS's slow pace for listing species).
204. Id. at 111 (describing NGO petition strategy when FWS delays listing
process).
205. Id. (describing NGO success in getting FWS to list species).
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tions play an important role in encouraging the FWS to list and

protect species.20 6
If Congress approves the FWS's budget cap proposal, the ESA
will suffer because the budget cap will limit its ability to utilize citizens as a resource for species conservation. 207 A budget cap would
be detrimental to the endangered species program because "the petition process appears to, on average, have helped improve the ESA
listing process." 208 The FWS claims, however, that without federal
intervention to reduce resources, the trend in citizen petitions will
(1) continue to permit groups to set FWS's agenda and (2) force
the FWS to reallocate its budget at a cost to high-priority listings. 209
Brosi and Biber's study on citizen petitions puts the FWS's first
claim to rest: Citizen petitioners are as good as or better than the
FWS at identifying at-risk species. 210 In fact, "[i]t also appears
pretty clear that litigation is offsetting political pressure on FWS not
to list species that might interfere with major development
projects."2 1 1 Thus, while environmental organizations may set or
restrict the FWS's agenda, no true harm has come from this agenda
setting, and the organizations help the FWS's decision-making process by better identifying at-risk species.2 1 2
With regard to the FWS's second concern, a cap for citizen petitions would likely reduce the number of citizen petitions filed and
therefore maintain the FWS's own priority system. 2 13 The result,
however, may be unfavorable to the FWS because citizen petitions

may help the ESA. 2 1 4 If there was a stringent cap, petitioners would
likely have less motivation to prepare quality petitions, which can be
very labor-intensive, due to the increased likelihood the FWS would
ignore the petition.21 5 With fewer high-quality petitions generated,
the probability of citizen petitions continuing to aid the ESA will
likely reduce.2 16
206. Id. at 109-12 (explaining role citizens play in environmental protection).
207. Biber, supra note 52 (arguing against budget cap requests).
208. Id. (arguing that citizen petitions help ESA).
209. Id. (discussing FWS's concerns with citizen petitions).
210. Id. (discussing study Biber co-authored with Brosi). For an in-depth discussion of Brosi and Biber's study, see supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
211. Id. (arguing citizen groups were good balance against developers).
212. Biber, supra note 52 (concluding FWS decision-making not harmed by
citizen petitions).
213. Id. (discussing merit to FWS's concern).
214. Id. (discussing problem with taking away too much power to create citizen petition).
215. Id. (articulating problem with citizen petition caps).
216. Id. (discussing likelihood that fewer citizen petitions would be as advantageous to FWS).
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Opponents of the citizen petition clause disagree with the preceding arguments. 2 1 7 Opponents argue that not only is an environmental agenda unfavorable to industry and landowner groups, but
it may also be injurious to certain species because listing decisions
may no longer be made according to what species have the greatest
need. 2 18 Each organization has separate and sometimes conflicting
priorities, and so ultimately it becomes a question of which organization can petition first and exert influence on the court.2 19 Concerns about citizen agenda setting, however, may ultimately be
trivial because "the species that citizen groups tend to care about
are those that make the biggest difference from an ecological standpoint."220 Still, the ad hoc nature of these listing decisions may be
an inefficient and disorganized way to establish FWS policy. 22 1
Opponents further contend citizen petitions hinder the FWS's
ability to utilize resources needed for species' protection by tying
up funds and resources in litigation.2 2 2 With the recent increase in
mega-petitions draining FWS resources, the FWS may "collapse
under the weight of all of them." 223 It therefore might not be a
question of whether citizens should be involved, but rather to what
extent. 224
Furthermore, even if petitions are good for listing decisions,
money wasted in litigation for critical habitat designation may disable the FWS. 2 2 5 According to Craig Manson, then Assistant Secretary of the DOI, "This flood of litigation over critical habitat
designation is preventing the [FWS] from protecting new species
and reducing its ability to recover plants and animals already
listed."2 26 Although courts have disagreed, the FWS argues critical
habitat designations provide insignificant benefits to a species once
217. For a discussion of arguments raised by opponents of the citizen petition
clause, see infta notes 218-232 and accompanying text.
218. Daggett, supra note 31, at 112 (labeling NGOs as ESA agenda setters).
219. Id. (explaining how NGOs set agenda of FWS).
220. Id. (describing reasons why NGO agenda setting may benefit species).
221. Id. (describing ultimate problem with policymaking if NGOs set
agenda).
222. See Fischman, supra note 111, at 473 (explaining how FWS must divert
funds to citizen petitions).
223. Biber, supra note 52 (explaining argument that number of petitions is
simply too high to be productive). Biber asserts that the argument that the high
number of petitions hinders the FWS is not without merit; however, he articulates
that there may be risk in creating a budget cap that is too low because of the value
petitions have on ESA process. Id.
224. For an opposing view, see supra notes 184-216 and accompanying text.
225. Rohlf, supra note 6, at 527 (articulating problem with critical habitat designation petitions).
226. Id. at 526 (quoting Craig Manson on critical habitat designations).
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the FWS lists the species. 22 7 Despite a lack of data on whether critical habitat designations benefit listed species, it is possible that, as
the FWS argues, no benefits ensue from these designations.2 28
Considering the recent findings by Brosi and Biber, the FWS
may have to concede that some quantity of citizen-involved listings

is vital to the success of the ESA from a preservationist perspective. 229 The trend in mega-petitions, however, raises the question of
whether environmental groups are taking their right to compel
FWS action too far.23 0 The pro-petition approach that emphasizes
biological threat fails to consider other viewpoints and agendas, including consideration for the substantial cost to landowners and in-

dustry groups that comes with compliance with federal regulation
of listed species. 231 Future considerations of the ESA must contemplate more than just the effectiveness of citizen petitions in identifying at-risk species if the ESA is going to withstand its opposition.2 32
B.

Is There Possible Reform on the Horizon?
The ESA is dysfunctional in its current state and desperately

needs reform.23 3 Considering the complicated facets of the FWS's

current dilemma, however, adequate reform is a daunting task.234
Accordingly, "[i] t is a key moment to strategize how to earn protection for as many species as possible, as efficiently as possible," rather
227. Id. at 527 (debating whether critical habitat designations benefit species). Environmental groups and their counterpart landowner and industry
groups disagree on the value of critical habitat designation. Id. at 528. Environmental groups side with the courts by asserting critical habitat designations are
crucial for effective conservation. Id. Landowners and industry groups, on the
other hand, find ways to invalidate the FWS's habitat designations by arguing, for
example, the FWS needs to make economic analyses of the designations. Id.
228. Id. at 528 (suggesting it is unclear whether critical habitat designations
are effective species conservation tools).
229. For a review of Brosi and Biber's findings, see supra notes 184-216 and
accompanying text.
230. For a discussion of why a flood of petitions might cripple the ESA, see
supra notes 217-228 and accompanying text.
231. For a discussion of costs to landowners and industrial groups, see supra
notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
232. For a discussion of possible ESA solutions, see infra notes 233-292 and
accompanying text.
233. Rolhf, supra note 6, at 496 (articulating need for ESA reform). A recent
poll suggests Americans are in favor of strengthening or maintaining the ESA, but
opposed to weakening it. Poll: Two-thirds of Americans Want Congress to Strengthen,
Protect Endangered Species Act, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DrvERSiTY (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news-/press releases/2013/endangered-spe
cies-act-03-04-2013.html. Furthermore, more than half of the United States believes the FWS has not done enough to protect species from extinction. Id.
234. Rolhf, supra note 6, at 496 (noting reform is difficult).
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than waste time debating about budget caps that hinder the FWS's
ability to protect species.2 3 5 Despite what many consider to be a
great need, reform seems unlikely in the near future.2 36
One solution to the FWS's dilemma is for the FWS to request a
significant increase in its budget so it can comply with its responsibilities under the ESA. 2 3 7 The FWS's current approach of requesting budget caps to stop citizen petitions is illogical and harmful to
the goals of the ESA because species protection requires sufficient
funding to be successful.2 3 8 Currently, the FWS lacks adequate
funding in all of its programs and as a result cannot properly "list[ ]
species on the brink of extinction, designat[e] critical habitat, and
prepar[e] adequate recovery plans." 239 The FWS could ask for the
requisite funding to execute these programs properly, rather than
deliberately seeking less funding to avoid battling megapetitions. 24 0
Increased funding could benefit threatened and endangered
species and satisfy environmentalists. 2 4 1 If the FWS had sufficient
funding, it could clear its backlog of species warranted for listing
but precluded from protection. 24 2 It could also pay for the expensive critical habitat designations it currently considers low priority. 24 3 If the FWS used this increased funding to list species and
designate critical habitats according to ESA deadlines, the number
of citizen petitions, settlements, and related litigation would likely
235. Hansen, supra note 161 (discussing strategies for species conservation).
Environmentalists, for example, suggest "more funding, broader application and
stronger enforcement of the ESA" as solutions for enhanced species protection.
Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluatingthe EndangeredSpecies Act, Its Effects on Man
and Prospectsfor Reform, 24 CumB. L. REv. 1, 69 (1993-1994).
236. See Sugg, supra note 235, at 69 (recommending ESA reform); Broderick,
supra note 26, at 121 (stating legislative reform is unlikely).
237. See Hurley, supra note 151 (quoting attorney Brendan Cummings of CBD
on budget increases); Robert L. Fischman, supra note 111, at 471-75 (describing
money as solution to problems with citizen petition).
238. Daggett, supra note 31, at 111-12 (describing FWS's refusal to request
needed resources). For a discussion of why FWS's budget caps are counterintuitive, see supra notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
239. Fischman, supra note 111, at 471-75 (explaining how FWS programs suffer from lack of funding).
240. Id. (describing money as solution to problems with citizen petition).
241. For a discussion of how increased funding would benefit listed species
and satisfy environmentalists, see infra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
242. See Daggett, supra note 31, at 111-12 (detailing FWS's backlog and refusal
to demand more federal funds). According to a few scholars, as of 2009, the FWS
needed $160 million to clear its backlog. Baur, Bean & Irvin, supra note 157, at
10010-11.
243. For a discussion of why the FWS dislikes designating critical habitats, see
supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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decrease because environmental groups would no longer need to
monitor and enforce these provisions of the ESA. 2 4 4
Increased funding would ultimately benefit the FWS because it
would allow the FWS to exercise higher quality decision-making. 2 4 5
With more money, the FWS could increase staffing in order to address its requirements under the ESA effectively. 246 Further, adequate funding would give the FWS the resources needed to take
thought-out, timely action, which would result in a greater unlikelihood that courts find the FWS's actions arbitrary and capricious in
judicial review suits. 24 7
Landowners and industry groups may initially oppose a budget
increase that leads to increased FWS action because such an increase in listed species may contribute to conflicts with development, land use, and industry. 248 FWS-initiated action, however,
may actually benefit these groups more than the status quo if it
means that they will not be left out of the "secret settlement" negotiations that preference an environmentalist agenda.2 49 With the
current budget crisis and a history of underfunding, however, landowners and industry groups may not need to become alarmed
about the potential increase in ESA listings. 250 This utopian proposal for increased funding has little chance of success; however, it is
nevertheless an option to consider.2 51
Another set of options includes ESA reform by Congress.2 52
First, Congress could change the listing criteria for species so that
the ESA no longer requires a scientific basis for listing. 25 3 Cur244. See generally, Daggett, supra note 31 (explaining NGO's various roles).
For a discussion of citizen-suits, see supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
245. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 963 (articulating problem
when Agency rushes to complete action).
246. Baur, Bean & Irvin, supra note 157, at 10011 (discussing need for funding increase to staff agency appropriately).
247. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 963 (explaining how failure to
meet deadlines results in finding of arbitrary and capricious).
248. For a discussion of landowner and industry groups' complaints with listing, see supra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
249. See Vitter, supra note 106 (explaining how industry and other interest
groups dislike being left out of FWS agenda setting).
250. Baur, Bean & Irvin, supra note 157, at 10010-11 (discussing likelihood of
receiving budget increase).
251. For a discussion of current federal budget constraints, see supra notes
147-171 and accompanying text.
252. For a discussion of possible congressional reform, see infra notes 253-282
and accompanying text.
253. Rohlf, supra note 6, at 501-07 (suggesting Congress could remove listing
decision's scientific evidence factor); see also Best Available Science Mandate, supra
note 139, at 398 (asserting allowing thin scientific evidence is more efficient than
increasing scientific standards). But see Baur, Bean & Irvin, supra note 157, at
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rently, the ESA requires the FWS to consider factors for listing in
light of the best scientific evidence available, but does not permit
the FWS to consider any other factors, including policy judgments. 2 5 4 Certain listing decisions, such as determining "the
threshold that marks whether a given species is secure or in peril of
extinction," cannot be made on pure science alone. 25 5 A better solution might be to permit an inquiry into both policy and science,
which would more accurately reflect the Agency's listing decisionmaking process and eliminate easy procedural challenges to the
FWS's scientific evidence. 25 6 A policy-based factor could also reduce disputes between competing interest groups and the FWS because the FWS could develop transparent policy that signals how
varying interests are considered in agency decision-making. 25 7
Second, Congress could amend Section Four of the ESA to require the FWS to make its critical habitat designation during the
recovery planning process instead of at the time of listing.2 5 8 Al10007 (articulating reasons why FWS should adopt science-based approach to listing priority guidelines).
254. Rohlf, supra note 6, at 502 (explaining importance of policy concerns for
listing species). Important policy considerations include, for example, whether
species should be ranked to factor in whether the species is an indicator, keystone,
or umbrella species. Id. at 507. When a species is an "indicator species," its health
provides evidence that other species in its habitat are also healthy and thriving. See
Douglas H. Chadwick, Yellowstone Grizzly Bears: Are They Still Endangered, or a Danger?, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/07/yellowstone-grizzly.bears n_1478701.html?page=2. When a
species is a "keystone species," the species "affect[s] prey populations directly
through hunting, scavenge [s] large carcasses in between, and redistribute[s] tons
of nutrients." Id. An "umbrella species" guards its habitat to provide security for
other wild animals and humans. See id.
255. Rohlf, supra note 6, at 502 (discussing how value judgments are necessary for species conservation).
256. Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, supra note 37, at 1138-39 (explaining how FWS could survive judicial review if policy were valid factor). According to Doremus, policy is a hidden factor in FWS decision-making, however,
problems arise because the FWS's decision must masquerade as being based in
"science." Id. at 1130-31. For example, "the ESA's 'strictly science' mandate rests
on the assumption that conservation policy decisions can be made objectively on
the basis of existing or reasonably attainable scientific knowledge. Because that
assumption is wrong, the mandate has been impossible to implement." Id. at 1056.
For a discussion of the FWS's difficulty in meeting the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review, see supra notes 114-146 and accompanying text.
257. Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, supranote 37, at 1153 (explaining how policy-based decision-making might resolve ESA conflict). The ESA's science mandate has been the subject of considerable debate between different
interest groups, in part because a science-based policy masks the FWS's policy considerations, and these groups cannot readily see how their interests are taken into
account. Id.
258. Rohlf, supra note 6, at 530 (proposing change in critical habitat designation deadlines).
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though this amendment would give the FWS enough time and resources to designate the species' habitat adequately, similar
amendments proposed in the past have failed in Congress.25 9 Despite Congress' failure to pass an amendment in recent years, the
idea to amend Section Four of the ESA to delay critical habitat designations until recovery planning is perhaps worth a second look.260
A shift in the deadline would give scientists enough time to research listed species' critical habitats, which would in turn help the
FWS to meet the best available scientific evidence standard needed
to prevail in court. 26 1 As a result, the higher quality scientific data
and increased likelihood of surviving hard look review could reduce
the amount of suits brought by landowners and industry groups.26 2
Further, a change in critical habitat designation deadlines may
encourage cooperation with various interest groups, which would
substantially reduce the FWS's burden.26 3 The FWS believes if critical habitat designation were discretionary at the time of listing,
landowners would be less likely to oppose species preservation because the Agency would not designate critical habitat on the land-

259. Id. (advocating for critical habitat designation reform). In 1999, Senator
Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island brought a bill that proposed changing the deadlines for critical habitat designations to the planning stage. Broderick, supra note
26, at 121-22; John H. Chafee, Amendments to the Critical Habitat Requirements
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, S. Rep. No. 106-126 (1999). Although the
bill received bipartisan support, it did not pass in the Senate, presumably because
"the political price for reforming the Act was simply too high, even though it was a
sensible change." Broderick, supra note 26, at 122. Former Representative Richard Pombo of California articulated that a main reason why ESA reforms were
impossible to pass was that representatives disagreed on how small property owners, often affected by the ESA, should be taken into consideration. Becky Oskin,
Endangered Species Act at 40: Rivals Find Common Ground, LIVE Sci. (Feb. 14, 2013,
5:00 PM), http://www.livescience.com/27155-endangered-species-act-rivals-meet
.html.
260. Ronny Millen & Christopher L. Burdett, Critical Habitat in the Balance,
Science, Economics, and Other Relevant Factors, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 227, 294-96
(2005) (explaining value of amending Section Four's critical habitat designation
deadlines).
261. Id. (discussing benefits of shifting deadlines for critical habitat
designations).
262. See Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, supra note 37, at 1076-77
(discussing how agency's scientific evidence may be found arbitrary and capricious
if not strong enough). For a discussion of best scientific evidence available standard and its use in court, see supra note 37 and notes 114-146 and accompanying
text.
263. For a discussion of how landowner, industry, and environmental groups
may respond to a change in critical habitat designation deadlines, see infra 264-266
and accompanying text.
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owner's property without proper investigation. 2 6 4 The plan could
also remove a legal foothold for citizen groups that use the FWS's
failure to designate a critical habitat as a tool to overwhelm the FWS
with litigation.26 5 Although the prior failure of similar attempts to
reform may suggest disapproval, such a proposal would likely garner support from the FWS, industry groups, and environmentalists
because similar proposals have previously received strong bipartisan
support.266
One barrier to this proposal is that it would require changes to
recovery planning deadlines if it were to maintain similar habitat
protections. 26 7 Under Section Four of the ESA, recovery plans do
not have deadlines. 2 68 If Congress refrained from amending Section Four to accommodate for recovery planning deadlines, the
process of acquiring a sufficient recovery plan could take years and,
from an environmentalist perspective, untenably delay critical
habitat designations. 2 6 9 Although the FWS would likely embrace
any solution without critical habitat or recovery planning designation deadlines, the solution would receive strong opposition from
environmentalists, particularly with respect to controversial listings. 27 0 Nevertheless, recovery planning deadlines would be prudent because without a set deadline, the FWS would have a better
excuse to refuse to designate critical habitats. 2 71

264. See CriticalHabitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 1 (explaining
ways landowners can cooperate with FWS). The FWS articulates the problem with
rushed designations:
Because both the statutory deadlines in the ESA and the court orders
generally do not allow time to research [habitats], the [FWS] must often
make decisions on incomplete information, or base decisions on where to
designate critical habitat on inferences from the needs of similar species,
or from the occurrences of types of vegetation often associated with a
species, rather than actual knowledge of the needs of a species.
Id. at 2.
265. For a discussion on petitioners' tactics to bring the FWS to court, see
supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
266. See Millen & Burdett, supra note 260, at 295 (suggesting plan would be
well-received); Rohlf, supra note 6, at 530 n.182 (describing proposal's support).
267. Millen & Burdett, supra note 260, at 294-95 (explaining how recovery
plan deadlines should be implemented).
268. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2012) (outlining recovery planning).
269. Kostyack & Rohlf, supra note 43, at 10208 (describing benefit of recovery
plan deadlines).
270. For a discussion of the FWS's lack of motivation to designate critical habitats, see supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. See Kostyack & Rohlf, supra
note 43, at 10208 (explaining necessity for recovery plan deadlines).
271. For a discussion of the FWS's critical habitat designation track record,
see supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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Third, Congress could also amend Section Eleven of the ESA
to make citizen petitions and related settlements more transparent.27 2 In February 2013, Republican Senator John Comyn of
Texas introduced the ESA Settlement Reform Act, a bill intending
to reduce citizen-suit abuses of the ESA. 273 To give landowner and
industry groups a voice in the settlement discussions, Senator
Cornyn's bill proposed the inclusion of local interest groups in discussions between the FWS and environmentalists. 2 7 4 In a statement
released after introducing the bill, Senator Cornyn stated, "ESA litigation abuse has shut out those folks most affected by the kind of
closed-door settlements we've seen."2 75 Senator Cornyn further
noted that his "bill opens up the process to give job creators and
local officials a say."2 76
If Senator Cornyn's bill is successful, those most likely to bring
claims against the FWS for review of the Agency's listings and designations would have an opportunity to intervene in backroom settlements before agency action is taken.2 77 The proposed change
could open up dialogue between opposing parties and reduce litigation and subsequent costs. 27 8 The bill is unpopular with environmentalists, however, who believe the change will only delay listing
and designations and increase litigation.27 9 Thus, environmentalists would likely be unsatisfied with the loss of power and would opt
to bring suits against the FWS rather than settle.28 0 The increase in
272. See The Endangered Species Settlement Reform Act, S. 19, 113th Cong.
(2013), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?cl 13:S.19: (proposing
amendment to Section Eleven of ESA).
273. Id. (describing Senator Cornyn's proposed bill); Cornyn Introduces Bill to
Prevent Abuse of Endangered Species Act Litigation,JOHN CORNYN (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.comyn.senate.-gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRec
ordjid=63eab662-4ab2-4611-86a7-9997f8ce4221 [hereinafter Cornyn Introduces Bill]
(discussing Senator Comyn's proposal to curb backroom settlements).
274. Cole Shooter, John Cornyn Introduces Endangered Species Act Settlement Reform Act, KFYO (Feb. 27, 2013, 6:33 PM), http://kfyo.com/john-cornyn-introducesendangered-species-act-settlement-reform-act/ (discussing Senator Cornyn's bill).
275. Cornyn Introduces Bill, supra note 273 (quoting Senator Cornyn on settlement agreements).
276. Id. (quoting Senator Cornyn on his proposed bill).
277. See Cornyn Favors Special Interests, Industry over Democracy, Protection of Species, CENTER FOR BIOLOGIcAL DIvERSiY (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/-press releases/2013/settlement-reform-act-02-27-2013.html
[hereinafter Cornyn Favors Special Interests] (discussing unfavorable power shift to
industry if Senator Cornyn's bill accepted).
278. Cornyn Introduces Bill, supra note 273 (explaining Senator Comyn's new
bill).
279. Cornyn Favors Special Interests,supra note 277 (describing downside of Senator Cornyn's new bill).
280. See id. (inferring without settlement agreements, environmental organizations will sue FWS to get species listed).
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lawsuits would further clog the courts and force the FWS to surrender to the environmentalist agenda.2 8 1 While many find it unlikely
that legislative reform will happen in the near future due to a lack
of past ESA reform success, it remains to be seen whether Senator
Cornyn's bill will garner enough support.28 2
Another possible solution would be to change how courts enforce agency deadlines. 28 3 Court enforced deadlines can be critical
to the outcome of a particular litigation:
If courts do not give agencies greater leeway because of
the deadline, then agencies will be more likely to lose arbitrary and capricious challenges. If agencies do not have
sufficient time to adequately consider and evaluate relevant factors or evidence, all else equal, decisions are more
likely to be overturned. 284
In other words, if courts did not require the FWS to meet the strict
deadlines of the ESA, the FWS would not lose as many suits to environmentalists and their counterpart landowner and industry
groups. 28 5 If deadlines were less likely to be enforced, much of the
tension coming from environmentalists and opponents of the ESA
would cease; therefore, the FWS would be free to do its job rather
than spend its time in court.2 86
If courts were to allow more flexible deadlines, however, they
may create "greater uncertainty and instability in administrative
law ... because of exceptions to long-standing doctrine."2 8 7 Consequently, greater uncertainty might lead to more litigation and ex281. Id. (asserting FWS will have more lawsuits if Senator Cornyn's bill
passes).
282. See Broderick, supranote 26, at 123 (explaining unlikelihood of reform).
283. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 973 (articulating role of courts
in agency effectiveness).
284. Id. (explaining problem with arbitrary and capricious review for agency
deadlines). Alden F. Abbott, Deputy Director of the United States Federal Trade
Commission, argues, "[S]tatutory deadlines frequently impose three types of costs
on society: (1) 'wasted resource costs' . . . (2) 'agency resource misallocation
costs' . . . and (3) 'regulatory inefficiency costs.'" Alden F. Abbott, Case Studies on
the Costs ofFederalStatutoy andjudicialDeadlines,39 AoMuN. L. REV. 467, 467 (1987).
285. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 973 (explaining concern with
arbitrary and capricious review for agency deadlines).
286. See id. (explaining relaxed court-imposed deadlines would grant Agency
ability to win lawsuits). The FWS contends it cannot perform many other important ESA tasks when it must spend its time and resources litigating critical habitat
designations. CriticalHabitat: Questions and Answers, supra note 44, at 1.
287. Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 973 (posing problems with alternative to courts' strict imposition of deadlines).
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pense if the FWS declines to voluntarily administer the ESA. 288
Courts would need to weigh "the costs to weakened coordination
from deadlines . . . against the benefits to regulatory outputs that

would not occur but for deadlines, or that would occur much more
slowly." 2 89 The question therefore is whether the FWS would be
motivated to engage in listing species and designating critical habitats without congressional or judicial pressure to do so, or whether
the deadlines are necessary to force the FWS to do its job. 290 If, as
many contend, statutory deadline enforcement impairs the FWS,
deadlines may be unproductive for the FWS and "may result in less
effective regulatory policy."29 1 Ultimately, it is possible the FWS
could do its job more efficiently if courts were less strict in enforcing statutory deadlines.2 9 2
V.

THE FUTURE OF THE

DOI's

ESA:

COULD SECRETARY JEWELL BE THE

DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH?

More than forty years after the ESA was enacted, many consider it ineffective because it fails to preserve the species it was
meant to protect.29 3 Despite obvious problems with the ESA and
numerous proposals for change, it is improbable that the ESA will
be reformed in the near future.29 4 First, it is more likely that the
FWS will see a stark decrease in its budget in the coming years,
rather than the increase it so greatly needs.2 9 5 Second, Congressional reform is doubtful, as previous attempts to reform the Act
have been unsuccessful.2 96 Even sensible solutions, such amend288. See id. (explaining potential negative effect of relaxing deadlines).
289. Id. at 977 (articulating normative arguments for and against deadlines).
290. See id. (discussing competing claims over value of enforcing or relaxing
deadlines).
291. Id. (discussing normative argument for deadlines).
292. See Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 49, at 977 (weighing benefit and
detriment of statutory deadlines for effective agency action).
293. See Rolhf, supra note 6, at 496 (discussing dysfunctional nature of ESA
programs).
294. See Sugg, supra note 235, at 69 (arguing for ESA reform); see also Broderick, supra note 26, at 121 (stating legislative reform is unlikely).
295. For a discussion of financial proposals to ESA reform, see supra notes
237-251 and accompanying text.
296. Broderick, supra note 26, at 121 (explaining unlikelihood of reform).
Since Senator Chafee's bill in 1999, at least a dozen reform bills have been proposed, however none succeeded. Id. at 122. See generally Assault on Wildlife: The
EndangeredSpecies Under Attack, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE (Sept. 2011), http://www

.defenders.org/sites/default/files/publications/-assault on wildlifethe endan
gered species act underattack.pdf (describing recent ESA reform bills that undermine ESA). For examples of failed bills, see The Critical Habitat Reform Act,
H.R. 2933, 108th Cong. (2004) (aiming to amend critical habitat designations to
give Secretary unfettered discretion in designating critical habitats); The Critical
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ments to Section Four of the ESA to allow critical habitat designations to be made at the time of recovery planning, have been
turned down due to political policy concerns.29 7
Unfortunately, because of conflicts between environmentalists,
politicians, landowners, and industry groups, the FWS finds itself in
a bureaucratic snare that gives the Agency little room to protect
species effectively.29 8 As more resources are funneled toward litigation and settlements, wildlife and the environment suffer.2 99 It is
particularly disheartening that well-intentioned environmental
groups actually create the FWS's dilemma.s0 0
Furthermore, it is possible that with the FWS's requests for
budget caps and the current budget crisis, species conservation may
be facing even greater threats.3 0 1 Although the ESA expired in
1993, it has continued to exist because of ongoing congressional
funding.3 0 2 A quick way to kill the Act would be for Congress to
stop giving money to the FWS to protect endangered and
threatened species.3 0 3 This appears to be what the FWS is asking
for when it continually requests that its budget be capped in order
to justify its failure to perform its mandated duties. 304 Even without
these requests, the United States government has been reducing
funding to the FWS and is currently under substantial budget con-

Habitat Enhancement Act of 2005, H.R. 1299, 109th Cong. (2005) (seeking to
amend ESA critical habitat designations); Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824 109th Cong. (2005) (attempting to revise provisions
of ESA, but rejected by senate because too controversial).
297. See Rohlf, supranote 6, at 530 (proposing change in critical habitat designation deadlines).
298. See Rolhf, supra note 6, at 496 (discussing problems between conflicting
groups); see also Woody, supra note 91 (explaining how FWS is failing). Patrick
Parenteau stated that the FWS "does seem to be reaching a political tipping point."
Id. (quoting Parenteau). For a discussion of how disputes between conflicting
groups place the FWS in predicament, see supra notes 172-179 and accompanying
text.
299. See Fischman, supra note 111, at 472 (discussing how FWS diverts resources to citizen petitions that should go toward species protection).
300. For a discussion of citizen-instigated litigation, see supra notes 79-113
and accompanying text.
301. For a discussion of the FWS's requested budget caps, see supra notes 147171 and accompanying text.
302. See Oskin, supranote 259 (noting Representative Pombo's comments on
expired ESA).
303. See id. (describing Representatives Pombo and McCloskey's view on ESA
stability).
304. For a discussion of the FWS's counterintuitive budget caps, see supra
notes 147-171 and accompanying text.
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straints. 30 5 Any additional decrease in funding would be detrimental to those species most in need of federal protection.3 0 6
Fortunately, a change in the DOI cabinet position may have an
effect on the FWS's policies and practices.3 0 7 In 2013, Secretary of
the Interior Ken Salazar asked to step down from his cabinet position.3 08 Replacing him is Sally Jewell. 309 While it is unclear how a
change in a cabinet member will affect DOI policy, including its
influence on the FWS and the ESA, Secretary Jewell's background
suggests big changes.3 10 At her nomination ceremony, President
Obama said, Jewell "knows the link between conservation and good
jobs. She knows that there's no contradiction between being good
stewards of the land and our economic progress - that, in fact,
those two things need to go hand in hand."31 1
Favored by environmental and business groups alike, Secretary
Jewell's pragmatic, business background might help the DOI and
the FWS resolve issues between business-minded landowner and industry groups and cause-oriented environmentalist organizations.3 12 Her experience appears to have already reflected a shift in
DOI policy that could bridge the gaps in ongoing ESA disputes.3 1 3
For example, Secretary Jewell has committed to reaching out to
state, landowner, and environmental groups to resolve the controversial sage grouse listing in a way that would satisfy all these
groups' varying interestS.3 14 SecretaryJewell has also expressed her
305. See Oskin, supra note 259 (describing lack of ESA funding).
306. For a discussion of the costs of federal protection of listed species, see
supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
307. See Matthew Daly, Sally Jewell Picked to Be Interior Secretary by Obama, Hur.
FINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013, 7:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/
06/sally-jewell-interior_n_2629550.html (discussing change in DOI Secretary).
308. Id. (discussing Ken Salazar's decision to step down). The Secretary cabinet position has often gone to western politicians such as Ken Salazar, who served
as a Colorado Senator before taking the cabinet position. Id.
309. Id. (describing Secretary Jewell).
310. Id. (explaining Secretary Jewell's credentials). Secretary Jewell worked
as president and CEO of REI, a large outdoor retailer, and therefore has both a
respect for outdoors and business knowledge. Id. Prior to working at REI, SecretaryJewell worked in the banking industry and was an engineer at Mobil Oil Corp.
Id.
311. Id. (quoting President Obama).
312. See Daly, supra note 307 (discussing Secretary Jewel's qualifications).
313. See id. (describing Secretary Jewell as nominee).
314. First Session to Consider the Nomination of Sally Jewell to be the Secretary of the
Interior: HearingBefore the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafterjewellFirstSession] (noting her commitment to
considering various interest groups' concerns when listing wildlife). The Gunnison Sage Grouse listing was a major topic during Secretary Jewell's confirmation
hearing. See id. The proposed listing is highly controversial in several western
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commitment to agency transparency, and she intends to incorporate this value into the DOI's "sue and settle" case resolutions.3 15
Although we must acknowledge the harsh reality that we may
never be able to protect every species from extinction, it is imperative that we keep the ESA itself from going extinct.3 1 6 Species conservation affects not only the species in need of federal protection,
but human life as well. 31 7 Species' health is an indicator of risks to
both human and environmental health.3 18 Furthermore, biodiversity plays a crucial role in science and medical advancements. 319 For
example, the rosy periwinkle, once nearly extinct, is now used in
the cure for Hodgkin's disease.32 0 The Yew, once valued only as
firewood, is now used to treat ovarian and breast cancer.3 21 Preserving our plant and animal life is of the utmost importance because it
may lead to the next big cure. 3 2 2 As the fortieth anniversary of the
ESA has concluded, Congress should consider options for increas-

states because of the economic impact the listing and critical habitat designation
will have on various interest groups. Amy Joi O'Donoghue, Service: Gunnison Sage
Grouse Listing, Protection Will Cost Millions to Utah, Colorado, DESERET NEWs (Sept. 18,
2013, 7:11 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865586666/Service-Gunni
son-sage-grouse-listing-protection-will-cost-millions-to-Utah-Colorado.html?pg=all.
One economic analysis indicates federal protection will cost twelve million dollars
for Utah and Colorado during the next twenty years. Id.
315. Jewell First Session, supra note 314 (expressing Secretary Jewell's commitment to transparency). In her testimony, Jewell stated, "At REI, I ran a business
rooted in transparency and integrity. If confirmed as Secretary of the Interior, I
pledge to abide by those same principles." Id.
316. See Rohlf, supra note 6, at 494 (discussing how lack of resources affects
FWS's ability to protect species). According to Rohlf, "The entirety of the
threatened and endangered lists still does not add up to the number of plants in
the original Smithsonian tally, and perhaps thousands of additional species today
face a very uncertain future with no federal legal protections." Id.
317. Sarah Matsumoto, Cara Pike, Tom Turner & Ray Wan, Citizens' Guide to
the Endangered Species Act, EARTHJUSTICE, 8 (2003), available at http://earthjustice
.org/sites/default/files/-library/reports/CitizensGuideESA.pdf [hereinafter Citizens' Guide] (discussing species' value to humans).
318. Id. (explaining how species can warn humans of risks to human health).
According to Robert L. Fischman, "Not only are endangered species indicators of
broader ecological problems, but ESA recovery solutions will likely repair damage
to the health of land, water, and (to a lesser extent) air." Fischman, supra note
111, at 475.
319. Citizens' Guide, supra note 317 (articulating how species are crucial for
medical and scientific advances).
320. Id. (explaining how rosy periwinkle helped medical and scientific
advances).
321. Id. (noting how yew helped medical and scientific advances).
322. Id. (explaining how species are crucial for medical and scientific
advances).
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ing the ESA's efficiency if it wants the Act to be successful in the

next forty years. 323
Candee Wilde*
323. See Richard Nixon, supra note 3 (explaining value of ESA).
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2011, University of Utah. The author would like to thank G. Kevin Jones for reviewing an
early draft of this article and providing exceptional mentoring throughout her externship at the United States Department of the Interior. The views expressed
here are solely those of the author and are not necessarily held by those who provided assistance at the Department of the Interior.
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